Thomas Rowe, 2021, "Can a Risk of Harm itself be a Harm?", Analysis. [pdf]

Simon Beard, Thomas Rowe, and James Fox, 2020, "An Analysis and Evaluation of Methods Currently Used to Quantify the Likelihood of Existential Hazards", Futures, Vol. 115, pp. 1-14. [pdf]

        Subject of the following response: Seth Baum, 2020, "Quantifying the Probability of              Existential Catastrophe: A Reply to Beard et. al", Futures, Vol. 123, pp. 1-8. [Link]

Thomas Rowe, 2019, "Risk and the Unfairness of Some Being Better Off at the Expense of Others", Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy, Vol. 16, No. 1, pp. 1-23. [pdf]

Thomas Rowe and Alex Voorhoeve, 2018, "Egalitarianism under Severe Uncertainty",

Philosophy & Public AffairsVol. 46, Issue 3, pp. 239-268. [pdf]

        Subject of a PEA Soup discussion, with a critical introduction by Brian Jabarian, May            2019 [Link]

Google Scholar profile here.

Under Review (Titles have been modified for peer review)

"Fairness and Weighted Lotteries" 

In this paper I argue that fairness requires the use of a weighted lottery in cases where individuals have unequal claims to a good. In doing do, I defend the importance of what I call the "principle of continuity" -- that a change in claim of some size x ought to warrant a similarly-sized change to what fairness requires. I argue that competing views fail to respect this principle.

"Many-Worlds Interpretation and Lotteries" (with David Papineau)

In this paper we argue against the stance that the many-worlds interpretation of quantum mechanics (MWI) makes no difference to rational choices. We show that the MWI in fact affects the rationality of using lotteries to allocate indivisible goods. 

Drafts of these papers are available upon request.

In Progress

"Intervening Agency and Enabling Evil"

In this paper I examine cases where an individual's good action enables an evildoer to commit wrongdoing. I consider the extent to which the intervening agency of the wrongdoer affects the permissibility of the actions of those who aim at good. I argue that the presence of intervening in such cases counts against an action because it leads to a wrongful redirection of a good act.  

Draft available upon request.

"Abundance and Scarcity" (with Gil Hersch)

In this paper we argue that there is a unique category of distributive scenario that we dub "bottleneck cases". Contemporary accounts of "first come first served" and lottery allocation mechanisms do not engage with these cases, but we argue that such cases warrant special attention. 

Draft available upon request.

"Making Decisions for Others"

Some have argued that when deciding on behalf of others, a decision-maker should act in line with the best interests of the subject, and others have argued that a decision-maker ought to be risk-averse when deciding for others. In this paper I argue that the extent to which a decision-maker ought to be risk-averse when deciding for another depends on the degree of certainty they have that they are acting in accordance with the individual's best interests.

"Other-Regarding Preferences under Ambiguity" (with Adam Dominiak, Michael Moehler and Sudipta Sarangi) 


In this paper we build off a 287-subject experiment that we conducted at Virginia Tech. We examine how individuals make ethical decisions under conditions of risk and ambiguity (where precise probabilities cannot be assigned to an event), and assess the extent to which subjects actions reflect different levels of risk and ambiguity as more or less fair.