Simon Beard, Thomas Rowe, and James Fox, 2020, "An Analysis and Evaluation of Methods Currently Used to Quantify the Likelihood of Existential Hazards", Futures, Vol. 115, pp. 1-14. [pdf]
Subject of the following response: Seth Baum, 2020, "Quantifying the Probability of Existential Catastrophe: A Reply to Beard et. al", Futures, Vol. 123, pp. 1-8. [Link]
Thomas Rowe, 2019, "Risk and the Unfairness of Some Being Better Off at the Expense of Others", Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy, Vol. 16, No. 1, pp. 1-23. [pdf]
Thomas Rowe and Alex Voorhoeve, 2018, "Egalitarianism under Severe Uncertainty",
Philosophy & Public Affairs, Vol. 46, Issue 3, pp. 239-268. [pdf]
Subject of a PEA Soup discussion, with a critical introduction by Brian Jabarian, May 2019 [Link]
Among top 10% downloaded papers between Jan 2018 - Dec 2019 in Philosophy & Public Affairs
Google Scholar profile here.
Under Review (Titles have been modified)
"Fairness and Weighted Lotteries"
In this paper I argue that fairness requires the use of a weighted lottery in cases where individuals have unequal claims to a good. In doing do, I defend the importance of what I call the "principle of continuity" -- that a change in claim of some size x ought to warrant a similarly-sized change to what fairness requires. I argue that competing views fail to respect this principle.
"Risk Imposition and Harm"
In this paper I defend the claim that risks of harm in themselves are not harms. I argue that on subjective and objective interpretations of risk, it is not plausible to view risks of harm as harms. This is because both sorts of risk fail to adequately interfere with the interests of the "victim".
"Aiding, Complicity and Blameworthiness"
In this paper I examine cases where an individual's good action enables an evildoer to commit wrongdoing. I argue that such cases raise issues for theories of permissibility and complicity. This is because there is a separation between the intentions of those who aim to do good and those who aim to do evil.
"Making Decisions for Others"
Some have argued that when deciding on behalf of others, a decision-maker should act in line with the best interests of the subject, and others have argued that a decision-maker ought to be risk-averse when deciding for others. In this paper I argue that the extent to which a decision-maker ought to be risk-averse when deciding for another depends on the degree of certainty they have that they are acting in accordance with the individual's best interests.
"Other-Regarding Preferences under Ambiguity" (with Adam Dominiak, Michael Moehler and Sudipta Sarangi)
In this paper we build off a 287-subject experiment that we conducted at Virginia Tech. We examine how individuals make ethical decisions under conditions of risk and ambiguity (where precise probabilities cannot be assigned to an event), and assess the extent to which subjects actions reflect different levels of risk and ambiguity as more or less fair.