Publications

Thomas Rowe and David Papineau, forthcoming, "Everett, Lotteries and Fairness", Thought. [pdf]

 

Thomas Rowe, 2021, "Can a Risk of Harm itself be a Harm?", Analysis, Vol. 81, pp. 694-701. [pdf]

Simon Beard, Thomas Rowe, and James Fox, 2020, "An Analysis and Evaluation of Methods Currently Used to Quantify the Likelihood of Existential Hazards", Futures, Vol. 115, pp. 1-14. [pdf]
 

 Subject of a response by Seth Baum, 2020, "Quantifying the Probability of                   Existential Catastrophe: A Reply to Beard et. al", Futures, Vol. 123, pp. 1-8. [Link]

Thomas Rowe, 2019, "Risk and the Unfairness of Some Being Better Off at the Expense of Others", Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy, Vol. 16, No. 1, pp. 1-23. [pdf]

Thomas Rowe and Alex Voorhoeve, 2018, "Egalitarianism under Severe Uncertainty",

Philosophy & Public AffairsVol. 46, Issue 3, pp. 239-268. [pdf]

      

Subject of a response by Akira Inoue and Kaname Miyagishima, 2022, "A Defense of Pluralist Egalitarianism under Severe Uncertainty: Axiomatic Characterization", The Journal of Political Philosophy. [Link]

Subject of a PEA Soup discussion, with a critical introduction by Brian Jabarian, May 2019 [Link]

Google Scholar profile here.
 

Under Review (Titles have been modified for peer review)

"Fairness and Weighted Lotteries" 

In this paper I argue that fairness requires the use of a weighted lottery in cases where individuals have unequal claims to a good. In doing do, I defend the importance of what I call the "principle of continuity" -- that a change in claim of some size x ought to warrant a similarly-sized change to what fairness requires. I argue that competing views fail to respect this principle.

Draft available upon request.

In Progress

"Intervening Agency and Enabling Evil"

In this paper I examine cases where an individual's good action enables an evildoer to commit wrongdoing. I consider the extent to which the intervening agency of the wrongdoer affects the permissibility of the actions of those who aim at good. I argue that the presence of intervening in such cases counts against an action because it leads to a wrongful redirection of a good act.  

Draft available upon request.

"Abundance and Scarcity" (with Gil Hersch)

In this paper we argue that there is a unique category of distributive scenario that we dub "bottleneck cases". Contemporary accounts of "first come first served" and lottery allocation mechanisms do not engage with these cases, but we argue that such cases warrant special attention. 

Draft available upon request.

"Ethics of Risk-Imposing Artificial Agents"

In this paper I consider the prospects for an ethics of risk imposition for artificial agents such as autonomous vehicles. Much work on the ethics of risk imposition is “moralised”, in that it assumes that risk-imposers have some kind of moral agency. I demonstrate how existing approaches to the ethics of risk imposition are not sufficiently compatible with existing models of artificial agents and canvas the prospects of a framework for the ethics of risk imposition.

"Other-Regarding Preferences under Ambiguity" (with Adam Dominiak, Michael Moehler and Sudipta Sarangi) 

 

In this paper we build off a 287-subject experiment that we conducted at Virginia Tech. We examine how individuals make ethical decisions under conditions of risk and ambiguity (where precise probabilities cannot be assigned to an event), and assess the extent to which subjects actions reflect different levels of risk and ambiguity as more or less fair.